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PROPERTY
I.

ZONING-ADOPTION OF THE PENDING ORDINANCE DOCTRINE

In Sherman v. Reavis,l the South Carolina Supreme Court
held that a "municipality may properly refuse a building permit
for a land use in a newly annexed area when such use is repugnant to a pending and later enacted zoning ordinance." Sherman is the first decision by the court in which it expressly recognized that denial of a permit may be based on a later enacted
ordinance.
In August 1977, the City of Charleston annexed a portion of
Charleston County known as "the Neck." This newly annexed
area was briefly without a valid zoning ordinance and several
landowners, seeking to take advantage of this fact, applied for
permits for uses previously prohibited under county ordinances.
The City of Charleston, however, denied plaintiffs' applications
for permits to construct billboards on private property 3 and, less
than three weeks later, passed its own ordinance forbidding the
use requested.4 Plaintiffs asserted a vested right to a permit on
the sole basis that at the time of the application the intended
use was permitted by law.5
Sherman made explicit what prior cases have implied-that
the making of an application will not in itself give rise to a
vested right that can withstand later zoning changes. In Whit-

field v. Seabrook,6 a permit was granted after passage of a new
1. 273 S.C. 542, 257 S.E.2d 735 (1979).

2. Id. at 545, 257 S.E.2d at 737.
3. The City of Charleston defended its denial of the permits on the following two
grounds: (1) that a city has a right to maintain the status quo of a newly annexed area
for a reasonable time while a new zoning ordinance is enacted; and (2) that the new
ordinance was pending at the time of the application. Brief of Appellant at 11, 18.
Charleston County Court Judge Theodore D. Stoney rejected the first argument at a
hearing on plaintiffs' request for a writ of mandamus and expressed "serious reservations" about allowing a denial on the basis of a pending ordinance. He granted the writ
ordering issuance of a permit on the ground that even if the pending ordinance doctrine
did apply in South Carolina, there had not been sufficient notice to plaintiffs in this
instance. Record at viii-xii.
4. See notes 11 & 18 infra.
5. 273 S.C. at 545, 257 S.E.2d at 737.

6. 259 S.C. 66, 190 S.E.2d 743 (1972).
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ordinance but with notice that the ordinance, which barred the
type of construction planned, would take effect in ten days.
Plaintiff failed to begin construction before that date, and the
permit was revoked. The South Carolina Supreme Court held
that the mere acquisition of the permit carried no right to begin
nonconforming construction after the new ordinance took effect
and the court affirmed the city's right to revoke. 7 Whitfield thus
implied that the mere applicationfor a permit does not create a
vested right to issuance of a permit after a new ordinance is
passed.
On the other hand, Pure Oil Division v. City of Columbia8
established that good-faith reliance upon zoning ordinances existing at the time of the application creates a vested right to a
permit that withstands ordinance changes subsequent to the application.' In Pure Oil, the court's considerable emphasis on
good-faith reliance suggested that without reliance the court
would have found that the applicant had no right to a permit. A
number of states have adopted the view that an applicant has no

vested right to a building permit if the law is changed prior to
issuance. 10 Underlying this general rule is the policy concern
that an applicant should not be able to disrupt a proposed zoning plan by asserting a right just prior to final enactment.11
South Carolina, however, by requiring that the ordinance be
pending at the time of the application in order to have any effect on the application, is one of about a half-dozen states that
limits the retrospective application of zoning ordinances. 12
Under Sherman, unless an applicant can show either good-faith

7. Id. at 72, 190 S.E.2d at 746.
8. 254 S.C. 28, 173 S.E.2d 140 (1970).
9. Id. at 35, 173 S.E.2d at 143.
10. 3 A. RATHKOPF, THE LAW OF ZONING

AND PLANNING

57-2 to 3 (4th ed. 1979). See,

e.g., Malmar Assocs. v. Board of County Comm'r, 260 Md. 292, 272 A.2d 6 (1971); Arcelo
Reprod. Co. v. Modugno, 31 A.D.2d 642, 296 N.Y.S.2d 257 (1968); Gulf Ref. Co. v. McKernan, 179 N.C. 314, 102 S.E. 505 (1920); McEachern v. Town of Highland Park, 124
Tex. 36, 73 S.W.2d 487 (1934).
11. See Miller v. Board of Pub. Works, 195 Cal. 477, 496, 234 P. 381, 388 (1925).
12. Other states include Pennsylvania, California, Illinois, and by implication Idaho.
See, e.g., City of Los Angeles v. Superior Court, 34 Cal. Rptr. 161 (Dist. Ct. App. 1963);
Lomond, Inc. v. City of Idaho Falls, 92 Idaho 595, 448 P.2d 209 (1968); Westerheide v.
Obernueferman, 3 Ill. App. 3d 996, 279 N.E.2d 402 (1972); Boron Oil Co. v. Kimple, 445
Pa. 327, 284 A.2d 744 (1971). See generally Annot., 50 A.L.R.3d 596, 620-32 (1973). Several states do not allow zoning statutes to have any retroactive effects. See 3 A.
RATHKOPF, supra note 10, at 57-4 to -6.
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reliance expenditures or the existence of a law upon which he
reasonably might have relied, an applicant has no right to a permit superior to a subsequent ordinance change, if at the time of
application the new ordinance is pending. 13 By implication, however, any right to a permit would not be defeated by subsequent
zoning changes if the application were made prior to pendency
of the ordinance.
The limitation on the general rule that subsequent enactment of a zoning statute may affect prior applications furthers
the policy underlying Pure Oil and Whitfield that a citizen
should be able to depend upon the laws of his municipality. A
city will not be allowed to delay issuance of a permit if, at the
time of the application, no proposed ordinance is pending. The
existence of a right to a permit, therefore, at least if there is no
reliance on existing law, depends on whether the proposed ordinance is "pending" at the time of application.
"An ordinance is legally pending when a governing body has
resolved to consider a particular scheme of rezoning and has advertised to the public its intention to hold public hearings on the
rezoning.

' 14

Thus, for an ordinance to be considered pending,

public notice is the first requirement. Notice of a public hearing
is adequate advertisement, even if the hearing has not actually
been held at the time of the application. 5 Furthermore, the
court indicated in dictum that notice may be derived from a
number of sources and need not be actual notice. "Clearly, the
matter of rezoning. . . was a matter of public notoriety at and
before the time of the filing . . . . [The Shermans] knew, or

could have known, through the newspaper advertisement, or the
maps which were on file, that the proposed ordinance would...
prohibit such a use.' '1 6
The second requirement is that some official action be un-

13. 273 S.C. at 545, 257 S.E.2d at 737.

14. Id. This same requirement is set forth by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court in
Casey v. Zoning Hearing Bd., 459 Pa. 219, 328 A.2d 464 (1974).
15. 273 S.C. at 546, 257 S.E.2d at 737. In Sherman, the local newspaper on August
12 published notice of an August 17 meeting of the zoning commission scheduled for

discussion of the proposed ordinance. That advertisement also gave notice of a public
hearing on the matter to be held before city council on September 13. The Shermans
requested and were denied a permit on September 8. The hearing was held by the city
council as scheduled on September 13. Record at I-HI.
16. 273 S.C. at 546, 257 S.E.2d at 737.
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dertaken amounting to a resolution to consider a particular
scheme. 17 An ordinance can be pending without any action by
city council.1 8 Beyond this, however, the court is vague in defining the earliest stage of the enactment process at which an ordinance can be declared pending. In Sherman, there had been
final action by the zoning commission, but the court indicated
that less than finality of action would be sufficient. The guideline that a governing body must have "resolved to consider a
particular scheme""9 gives the court considerable room within
which to apply the pending ordinance doctrine and may lead to
a fairly broad application in subsequent cases.
In interesting contrast to Sherman, the South Carolina Supreme Court did not apply the doctrine to the analogous circumstances of Scott v. Carter,20 decided only five days earlier. Scott
arose from action by the Greenville County Council to delay issuance of a building permit until a decision to rezone was made.
The council had received a petition to rezone an area from multifamily to single family, a change that would preclude apartment construction. The next day, plaintiff, with knowledge that
the council had referred the matter to committee, applied for a
permit to build apartments in the same area. After the county
administrator ordered the delay in processing the application, a
majority of the supreme court upheld a writ of mandamus ordering the county to issue the permit.21 The right of the plaintiff to
a permit arose from his prior reliance on the existing statute. 22
No mention was made by the majority of a pending ordinance.
Justice Ness, however, dissenting, concluded inter alia23

that an ordinance was pending and, therefore, that the action to

17. Id.
18. Id. at 547, 257 S.E.2d at 738. The city planning and zoning commission recommended the ordinance on August 17 but the formal recommendation was not presented
to the city council until September 13, five days after the permit was denied. The city
council gave first reading on September 13 and final approval on September 27. Id. at
,257 S.E.2d 736.
19. Id. at 546, 257 S.E.2d at 737.
20. 273 S.C. 509, 257 S.E.2d 719 (1979).
21. Id. at 517, 257 S.E.2d at 722.
22. See id. at 513, 257 S.E.2d at 721.
23. Justice Ness also concluded that the applicant had failed to supply all the
materials necessary for the application to be complete. He contended, therefore, that the
county had not been the cause of any delay in the issuance of the permit. 273 S.C. 509,
517-19, 257 S.E.2d 719, 723-24 (Ness, J., dissenting).
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delay approval was allowable so long as plaintiff could not show
a superior vested right to a permit.2" Addressing the argument
that a right arose from reliance, Justice Ness indicated that
plaintiff's rights could not vest prior to the time of application
for the building permit. He concluded that since plaintiff had
notice of the proposed ordinance at the time he applied, he
could not claim good-faith reliance under the existing ordi-

nance. 25 Significantly, this analysis by Justice Ness implies he
would not have reached a different conclusion in Sherman, even
if reliance had been present in that case.
The justice's dissent went even further, however. Analyzing
the claim of reliance, Justice Ness contended that under
Douglass v. City Council of Greenville 26 expenditures made in
preparation for the project did not create a right "superior to
the interest of the public in the valid exercise of the police
power" 27 by the county. There are factual differences, however,
between Scott and Douglass that make reliance on the latter
difficult. In Scott, unlike Douglass, there was no showing of public necessity. In Douglass, the South Carolina court upheld the
power of a city to legislate against uses endangering the public
health and welfare. 28 The intended meaning of the statement by
Justice Ness is, therefore, unclear. Absent a showing of necessity, however, his view would seem to conflict with the language
of Pure Oil Division v. City of Columbia:
We see no sound reason to protect vested rights acquired
after'a permit is issued, and to deny such protection to similar
rights acquired under an ordinance as it existed at the time a
proper application for a permit is made. In both instances, the
right protected is the same, that is, the good faith reliance by
the owner on the right to use his property as permitted under
the Zoning Ordinance in force at the time of the application for
a permit. There are no intervening considerations of public ne-

24.
25.
26.
27.

Id. at 521, 257 S.E.2d at 725 (Ness, J., dissenting).
Id. at 520, 257 S.E.2d at 724 (Ness, J., dissenting).
92 S.C. 374, 75 S.E. 687 (1912).
273 S.C. at 519, 257 S.E.2d at 724 (Ness, J., dissenting).

28. Plaintiff was given a permit to use his property for a stable, a use not prohibited
by any ordinance in force at that time. Plaintiff spent several hundred dollars preparing
the property before an ordinance was passed forbidding stables within the city. The
court upheld the power of the city to revoke the permit upon a determination that the

use would be a menace to public health. 92 S.C. at 383, 75 S.E. at 689.
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cessity involved under the facts of this case.29
Despite the lengthy dissent, the failure of the Scott majority
to apply the pending ordinance doctrine to the facts of that case
is understandable. In addition to evidence of reliance on the existing statute by the applicant, there was no indication that any
further action to rezone the subject property had occurred by
the time of the lower court mandamus hearing three weeks later.
This factor, combined with the council's minimal action on the
matter when it was first presented, might lead to the conclusion
that there had been no "resolution to consider a particular
scheme of rezoning." Unfortunately, since the court in Scott
chose not to consider the fact that the council had taken some
action toward rezoning and also chose not to distinguish the case
later in Sherman, the significance of Scott to the pending ordinance doctrine is open to some question.
What is clear is that one justice, Justice Ness, found the
county council's referral of a petition to committee to be sufficient action to create a "pending ordinance. 30 The other justices did not discuss whether they would have found the action
sufficient to invoke the doctrine in other circumstances. Justice
Ness would apparently have no difficulty extending the pending
ordinance doctrine beyond the facts of Sherman to ordinances
that amend existing ordinances. Indeed, other states have done
the same. 1 The precedential significance of two earlier South
Carolina cases, Niggel v. City of Columbia3 2 and Stevenson v.
Board of Adjustment,33 however, would be uncertain in light of
such an application of the doctrine. Niggel, citing Stevenson,
held that a citizen cannot be denied the use of property for a
purpose expressly permitted by law.3 4 Furthermore, unlike
Sherman, Scott raised the question of reliance and its role in
the pending ordinance doctrine.

29. 254 S.C. at 34, 173 S.E.2d at 143. Justice Ness, however, did not suggest in Scott

that Pure Oil is in conflict with his position. See generally Note, The Building Permit
and Reliance Thereon in South Carolina, 21 S.C.L. Rv. 70, 78-80 (1968).
30. 273 S.C. at 521, 257 S.E.2d at 725 (Ness, J., dissenting).
31. See, e.g., City of Los Angeles v. Superior Court, 34 Cal. Rptr. 161 (Dist. Ct. App.
1963); Westerheide v. Obernueferman, 3 IM.App. 3d 996, 279 N.E.2d 402 (1972); Boron

Oil Co. v. Kimple, 445 Pa. 327, 284 A.2d 744 (1971).
32. 254 S.C. 19, 173 S.E.2d 136 (1970).
33. 230 S.C. 440, 96 S.E.2d 456 (1957).
34. 254 S.C. at 23, 173 S.E.2d at 137.
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These questions are left for a later day, but if the other justices share the relatively broad position embraced by Justice
Ness, it can be expected that, if proper notice of a proposed
change is issued, nearly any official action toward a consideration of rezoning will be deemed sufficient to invoke an application of the pending ordinance doctrine.
II.

RECORDING OF INSTRUMENTS-DETERMINATION OF PRIORITY

In Atlas Supply Co. v. Davis,3 5 the South Carolina Supreme

Court was asked to determine the priority between two liens recorded the same day. Plaintiffs had obtained a judgment lien
against defendant Davis based on an open account that had existed in 1971 and 1972. The judgment was given on June 21,
1973, and filed for record in Orangeburg at 9:58 a.m. on June 25.
Defendant First Federal Savings and Loan Association held a
mortgage executed by Davis on the morning of June 25 and recorded the same day at 11:59 a.m. The court favored the mortgage, the second lien recorded,3 6 relying heavily upon Prudential
37
Insurance Co. of America v. Wadford
The South Carolina recording statute8 protects the rights
of subsequent creditors only.39 The typical sequence envisioned
by the statute is one in which A receives a mortgage from X, but
does not record the mortgage until after B has extended credit
to X without knowledge of the mortgage. The statute provides
that the claims of B, as a subsequent creditor without notice,
will be protected against A's lien, although A was the first to
40
execute.

35. 273 S.C. 392, 256 S.E.2d 859 (1979).
36. Id. at 395, 256 S.E.2d at 860.
37. 232 S.C. 476, 102 S.E.2d 889 (1958).
38. S.C. CODE ANN. § 30-7-10 (1976).
39. 232 S.C. at 480, 102 S.E.2d at 891-92.
40. S.C. CODE ANN. § 30-7-10 (1976) lists the documents within its scope and then
provides in relevant part as follows:
[The instruments] shall be valid so as to affect the rights of subsequent creditors (whether lien creditors or simple contract creditors) or purchasers for valuable consideration without notice only from the day and hour when they are
recorded ....
But in the case of a subsequent purchaser of real estate, or in
the case of subsequent lien creditor on real estate or personal property or both,
for valuable consideration without notice, the instrument evidencing such subsequent conveyance or subsequent lien must be filed for record in order for its
holder to claim under this section as a subsequent creditor ... and the prior-
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The situation is more complicated if B records a judgment
lien between the time A executes and records. In that case, application of the statute depends upon whether the debt on which
the judgment is obtained was incurred prior to or subsequent to
the mortgage execution. This issue was raised in Wadford, which
held that the recording statute does not protect the judgment
creditor who records the judgment between the execution and
recording of a mortgage if the judgment is obtained on a debt
incurred prior to the mortgage execution. 1 Professor Means,
summarizing the post-Wadford position of the law, asserted that
"an unrecorded mortgage has priority over a judgment against
the mortgagor based upon a debt contracted prior to the execution of the mortgage but entered subsequent thereto . .

.-.

Plaintiff in Atlas Supply argued at length that an amendment to the recording statute after Wadford placed Atlas Supply within the scope of the statute and made the time of recording the determinative factor of priority.4 3 The South Carolina

-Supreme Court, however, indicated that the amendment was intended merely to limit statutory protection to subsequent creditors who recorded first, and did not change the requirement that
a judgment lien be upon a subsequent debt."
Therefore, with the Wadford decision in mind, the court in
Atlas Supply looked first to the judgment lien and determined
that since it was for an antecedent debt, the recording statute

ity shall be determined by the time of filing for record.

Id.
41. 232 S.C. at 480, 102 S.E.2d at 892. See Carraway v. Carraway, 27 S.C. 576, 581,

5 S.E. 157, 159 (1886).
42. Means, The Recording of Land Titles in South Carolina (Herein of Bona Fide
Purchase of Land): A Title Examiner's Guide, 10 S.C.L.Q. 346, 377 (1958).
43. Brief of Appellant at 16-19. The amendment to the present § 30-7-10 referred to
by plaintiff added the sentence beginning with "[b]ut in the case of a subsequent purchaser.. ." and ending with "priority shall be determined by the time of filing for re-

cord." See note 40 supra.
44. 273 S.C. at 395, 256 S.E.2d at 860. The court held that the amendment was
designed to correct the result of South Carolina Nat'l Bank v. Guest, 232 S.C. 367, 102
S.E.2d 215 (1958), rather than Wadford. In Guest, two chattel mortgages were executed
on the same day and recorded in the same sequence the next day. The court favored the

later mortgage because at the time it was executed, the first mortgage, although executed, was not recorded. The second mortgage was held to have priority, thus protecting
the subsequent creditor from a lien of which there was no notice. Id. at 373, 102 S.E.2d

at 218. Further, the court would not protect one who failed to protect himself by prompt
recording. Id. at 372, 102 S.E.2d at 217-18.
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was inapplicable. 45 The court then applied Wadford as controlling law and held that the First Federal mortgage, which was
recorded after the judgment lien, had priority. 4 In reaching its
conclusions, however, the court failed to mention the sequence
of the recording of the judgment and the execution of the mortgage. The judgment lienholder's brief filed in Atlas Supply
stated that the judgment was recorded prior to execution of the
mortgage,47 and there was testimony that the recording preceded
the mortgage closing.4 8 This sequence, if proven, would distinguish Atlas Supply from Wadford.
Wadford made no reference to the situation in which B recorded his judgment prior to even A's execution of the mortgage.
To extend Wadford to these facts would go well beyond the law
as previously interpreted by Professor Means.49 The effect would
be that a mortgage, executed at any time, could be used to defeat a prior-recorded judgment lien on the same property. Under
this interpretation it would be pointless to record judgment liens
at all if the judgment is on an antecedent debt.
Therefore, if the judgment lien in Atlas Supply were, in
fact, recorded prior to execution of the mortgage, reason suggests the better course would have been for the court to follow
the common-law principle that "first in time is first in right" 0
and to give priority to the judgment lien. In this situation, no
statute has directly preempted the common law and there is no
overriding reason or precedent for rejecting the common-law
principle at this late date.5 1 If, on the other hand, the court assumed that the judgment was recorded after execution of the
mortgage and intended no extension of Wadford, it is hoped
that the confusion caused in this area of the law will be eliminated in future opinions.

45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.

273 S.C. at 394, 256 S.E.2d at 860.
Id.
Brief of Appellant at 5, 18.
Record at 36-37.
See- note 42 and accompanying text supra.
See Powers v. Fidelity & Deposit Co., 180 S.C. 501, 510-11, 186 S.E. 523, 527-28

(1936).
51. O'Hagan v. Fraternal Aid Union, 144 S.C. 84, 88, 141 S.E. 893, 894 (1927); S.C.
§ 14-1-50 (1976). In addition, when the legislature does not intend for this
rule to apply, it has expressly so stated. E.g., S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 14-1-60, 15-1-10 (1976).
CODE ANN.
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GIFT IN PARAMOUR
INTEREST OF SUBSTITUTIONAL LEGATEE

WILLS-VESTING OF PART OF

DEFEATS

In Ray v. Tate,52 the South Carolina Supreme Court held
that the interest of a substitutional legatee in a-will was destroyed by the vesting of a gift in the primary taker, even
though the primary beneficiary was not allowed by law to receive
the full gift intended.53
South Carolina law limits the amount that a paramour can
receive from a testator with whom she lived in adultery." In
Ray, the testator devised his entire estate to his paramour with
the provision that if she did not survive him, the property
should pass to her niece. The paramour survived and collected
without contest her one-fourth share of the estate as allowed by
the statute. The niece, however, claimed a remainder interest in
the remaining three-fourths of the estate, which she contended
should accelerate and pass to her upon failure of the prior
estate.
The court had held in White v. White 55 that if a paramour
of the testator is left his entire estate, she is entitled to a onefourth share, with the remaining share passing by intestacy.5 6
White, however, did not involve a condition of survivorship, and
Ray marks the first occasion in which the court has determined
the interest of a contingent legatee in the distribution of the
larger share.
Since a remainder cannot follow a fee simple,57 the South

Carolina Supreme Court rejected the niece's claim to a remain-

52. 272 S.C. 472, 252 S.E.2d 568 (1979).
53. Id. at 476, 252 S.E.2d at 570.
54. S.C. CODE ANN. § 21-7-480 (1976) reads as follows:
If any person who is an inhabitant of this State or who has any estate

therein shall beget any bastard child or shall live in adultery with a woman,
such person having a wife or lawful children of his own living, and shall give,
by legacy or devise, for the use and benefit of the woman with whom he lives in
adultery or of his bastard child or children, any larger or greater proportion of
the real clear value of his estate, real or personal, after paying of his debts than
one-fourth part thereof, such legacy or devise shall be null and void for so

much of the amount or value thereof as shall or may exceed such fourth part of
his real and personal estate.
Id.
55. 212 S.C. 440, 48 S.E.2d 189 (1948).

56. Id. at 445, 48 S.E.2d at 191.

57. L.

SIMES, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF FUTURE INTERESTS
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der and instead, characterized her interest as substitutional. 8
Under the terms of the will, the niece could take her interest
only if the paramour failed to survive the testator; because the
paramour survived to claim her share, the exact contingency of
the will had not occurred and the substitutional gift could not
vest.5 9 Therefore, the substitutional beneficiary had no interest
in the estate of the testator and the amount of the gift to the
paramour greater than that permitted by law must pass under
the laws of intestate succession.
IV.

EMINENT DOMAIN-DETERMINATION

OF A PUBLIC USE

After plans for a joint undertaking between the City of
Charleston and a private developer for the construction and operation of a parking garage and convention center were declared
unconstitutional in 1978,60 the city revised its plan. In Goldberg
6 1 the South
v. City of Charleston,
Carolina Supreme Court held
that the constitutional impediments to the original plan had
been removed in the revision.2
In Karesh v. City of Charleston,3 the court had invalidated
the exercise of the city's condemnation powers for acquisition of
the site, because the proposed use would not have served the
public. Under the original plan, the city would have condemned
property for the site of a facility to be leased and controlled by a
private developer. The only restriction on the developer's use
was the requirement that the parking garage be made available
"on reasonable demand to all members of the general public" 64
with a maximum of ten percent of the space reserved for patrons
of the developer. The court, in considering the degree of control
to be exercised by the developer and the inadequacy of guarantees that the public could beneficially use the facility, found that
use by permission of the developer failed to assure that the project would be for the "public use" and that, therefore, the
planned exercise of the city's condemnation powers would be an
58. 272 S.C. at 475, 252 S.E.2d at 570.

59. Id. See also In re Waring's Will, 293 N.Y. 186, 56 N.E.2d 543 (1944).
60. See Property,Annual Survey of South CarolinaLaw, 31 S.C.L. REv. 119, 119-22
(1979).
61. 273 S.C. 140, 254 S.E.2d 803 (1979).

62. Id. at 141, 254 S.E.2d at 804.
63. 271 S.C. 339, 247 S.E.2d 342 (1978).
64. Id. at 344, 247 S.E.2d at 345 (quoting Record at 21).
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unconstitutional interference with the owner's right to use private property. 5
The revised plan upheld in Goldberg provided that responsibility for operation of the garage will remain with the city and
the public will be given "the enforceable right to use the parking
facility." 8 The court found these provisions sufficient to insure
that condemnation will be for the "public use." That some of
the public using the facility may also be patrons of the developer
does not defeat the "public use" requirement, so long as the
public has an enforceable right of use and the project is not pri6
marily for the benefit of the private developer. 7
Robert M. Wilcox

65. Id. at 344, 247 S.E.2d at 345.
66. 273 S.C. at 142, 254 S.E.2d at 804.
67. Id.
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